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The decision-making process in Egypt during the rule of President Hosni Mubarak was domi-
nated by the president and a very small core group comprised mainly of advisers whom he 
appointed and dismissed. Towards the end of his rule, Mubarak was no longer capable of 
resuming his duties effectively. Therefore, several issues were left to be handled by the relevant 
ministry. It became possible for some parts of the bureaucracy to make a significant impact on 
foreign policy, particularly on topics not of interest to the ruling elite. The Nile Waters issue is 
one of the most important manifestations of the dynamics of Egypt’s foreign policy decision-
making process under Mubarak at this stage. The analysis explores the role of institutions in 
water policy making, aiming to draw attention to the dominant role of the Ministry of Water 
Resources during the Cooperative Framework Agreement talks compared to other institu-
tions, such as the foreign ministry. Also it examines the phenomenon of ‘bureaucratic rivalry’ 
that prevailed at that time, while demonstrating that the Egyptian delegation faced great dif-
ficulties during the talks. Thus, the argument remains that the bureaucratic institution, despite 
its subordinate role, is partly responsible for Egypt’s foreign policy unhappy ending under 
Mubarak. 
Keywords: decision-making process, bureaucratic politics, African politics, Egypt’s Africa pol-
icies, Egyptian foreign ministry, President Mubarak, Nile Waters issue. 
Introduction
The River Nile has always been a great concern of Egypt’s rulers, who have adopted 
internal and external policies in order to secure what is almost Egypt’s sole water resource. 
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Domestically, the state has sought to enhance its capacity to exploit the Nile Waters and 
to secure the irrigation process [1, pp. 125–146]. In fact, Egypt has invested billions in the 
construction of a huge irrigation network of 35,000 kilometres of canals and banks, at an 
estimated cost of nearly 200 thousand trillion Egyptian pounds in today’s currency [2]. 
Regarding external policy, policy objectives pursued throughout history have been, on the 
one hand, to ensure the greatest possible benefit from the Nile Waters and to secure the 
continuous and sufficient flow of waters to Egypt every year, and on the other, to avoid 
any water crises between the riparian states as a result of disputes over the distribution of 
water [3, p. 27]. Increasing the possibility of a water crisis is the intervention of politically 
influential external parties in the Nile Basin region. [4, pp. 372–373]. In this context, the 
Egyptian position is built on the following principles: not to allow the water issue to be 
used as a weapon to enforce certain views towards Egypt’s policy; to maintain stability; 
to avoid being engaged in conflicts; to enhance political, economic, and developmental 
cooperation among the Nile Basin countries; to promote efforts that seek to increase the 
water yield; to provide technical assistance to the riparian states in various domains, espe-
cially infrastructure; to refuse individual water projects that lack the consent of all of the 
riparian states; to establish the necessary platforms for mutual cooperation; and to adopt 
continuous dialogue as the sole means of resolving conflicts [4, pp. 377–378]. Evidently, 
the absence of a coercive power in the south capable of challenging Egypt’s ‘rights’ to the 
river has helped Egypt to implement its vision for decades. Furthermore, until recently, 
no other country had acquired the technological expertise to control the river’s flow on its 
way north. [5, p. 127]. Consequently, it was the responsibility of the Egyptian state actors 
to endorse the water policies that act according to the aforementioned principles. The 
following part shows the mandate and the behaviour of each of the state institutions, re-
sponsible for the Nile Waters issue particularly during the Cooperative Framework Agree-
ment’s talks. 
Perceptually, the formulation of Egypt’s water policy is the responsibility of the Su-
preme Committee for Nile Waters. This committee is the product of intensive discussions 
and decisions made by multiple state institutions. The committee is headed by the Prime 
Minister and is composed of  the foreign minister as well as the ministers of irrigation, 
international cooperation, defence, and electricity, alongside the director of the GIS (Gen-
eral Intelligence Service). The committee is primarily concerned with the political impli-
cations of the Nile Waters issue, and thus meets only as necessary. Examples of the issues 
with which the committee deals are the legal and political debates between Egypt and 
upstream countries about the rights to use the Nile Waters; external intervention in the 
region and its effect on Egypt’s water interests; and the relationship of international water 
treaties to the Nile Waters agreements. It has the right to raise its proposals and decisions 
in this regard directly with the president [6].
By and large, different institutions have had to adopt policies that correspond to the 
policy orientations formulated by the Supreme Committee and approved by the president 
[4, p. 372]. However, with regard to decision-making, President Mubarak was the princi-
pal decision-maker on the Nile Waters issue. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that 
there were opportunities for others to participate in the decisions made on this issue [6]. 
The Nile Waters issue is primarily characterized by its scientific and legal natures, which 
make it difficult for a political leader to make decisions without consulting experts. Fur-
thermore, one must consider the personality traits of President Mubarak that led him to 
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endorse his predecessor’s views. For decades, Egypt insisted on the principle of “historical 
and acquired rights” towards the Nile Waters. Naturally, President Mubarak did not dare 
to deviate from such a policy, which the Supreme Committee also recommended. In this 
regard, Mubarak repeatedly stated: “Egypt’s rights in the Nile Waters is a red line.” [7]. 
Moreover, President Mubarak’s tendency to consider every minister his advisor in his do-
main of expertise and the subsequent effect on Mubarak’s decisions to be based on the in-
formation given to him by those advisors, supports this analysis. By virtue of his technical 
competence on the Nile Waters’ issue, the influence of Mahmoud Abu Zeid, the Irrigation 
Minister, on Mubarak’s decision thus exceeded that of the other officials including the 
foreign minister and the chief intelligence officer [8].
The role of the Egyptian institutions
Among the Egyptian bureaucracy, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation 
plays a central role in managing Egypt’s water resources. Besides its role on the domes-
tic level with regard to managing and developing water resources, the Ministry of Water 
Resources coordinates with the ministries of foreign affairs and defence, in addition to 
the intelligence service, which is pivotal due to their roles regarding cooperation with 
the Nile Basin countries (NBCs). Under the Ministry is the Nile Waters Sector, which is 
responsible for managing water resources coming to Egypt from the Nile Basin region. 
The sector’s mandate is to work to maintain Egypt’s historical rights towards the Nile 
Waters and to defend it in different international forums; to represent Egypt in talks on 
the Nile Waters, to examine the Nile Basin states’ technical assistance needs and to work 
to achieve them; to study projects that the Nile Basin states are planning to construct; and 
to determine the effect of these projects on Egypt’s water share. In addition, the sector is 
entitled to supervise the implementation of the 1959 agreement with Sudan, and to review 
the operation of the Owen Reservoir according to the 1953 agreement with Uganda. It is 
noteworthy that the Nile Waters Sector is considered the architect of Egyptian attitudes to-
wards the Nile Basin Initiative projects and the Cooperative Framework Agreement talks 
(1999–2010) [7; 9]. The head of the Nile Waters Sector has been authorized to invite rep-
resentatives of the national institutions involved in the Nile waters issue to coordinative 
meetings, particularly the ministries of irrigation, foreign affairs, the intelligence service, 
and the legal consultant of the ministry of water resources. Participants in these meetings 
formed the Egyptian Negotiating Committee, in charge of preparing the institutional and 
legal framework of the NBI (Nile Basin Initiative). The committee formerly met at least 
once a month at the headquarters of the Nile Waters Sector and led discussions of the 
39 articles comprising the draft agreement, which were presented to the prime minister 
and the president [7; 9]. 
As for the Foreign Ministry, the organizational structure of the ministry included spe-
cific departments that should have allowed it to play an influential role in decisions related 
to the Nile Waters issue. The departments of political planning and crisis management, 
international legal affairs and treaties, Nile Water affairs, relations with the Nile Basin 
countries, and the minister’s cabinet were all engaged in the making and implementation 
of the ministry’s policy towards the Nile Waters issue. With the exception of the depart-
ment of political planning, which had various structural and technical weaknesses that 
undermined the reasons for its existence as a research organ of the ministry [10, pp. 980–
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993], the remaining departments were actively engaged in monitoring the development of 
the issue; attending the relevant national, regional and international forums; negotiating; 
making assessments and recommendations to the foreign minister; and coordinating with 
other relevant national institutions. During the 1980s, certain actors helped the ministry 
to make significant contributions to Egypt’s water policy. In this respect, the personality 
of the foreign minister played a great role. During the 1980s, when Boutros-Ghali was the 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, African affairs and the Nile Waters issue witnessed 
a strong boost. Boutros-Ghali exploited his good connections with President Mubarak to 
convince the latter to adopt an active policy in the continent and towards the Nile Waters 
issue in particular (e. g. extending the work of the Egyptian Fund at early to include more 
African countries and creating the Undogo in 1983, the first forum aiming to enhance 
cooperation projects between the NBCs) [8]. The second element was the comforting 
and calm atmosphere that dominated relations between the riparian states. No points of 
dispute arose during that time between the upstream and the downstream countries. The 
calm environment that surrounded the Nile Waters issue allowed the foreign ministry to 
play an active and relatively independent role, without pressure from other institutions 
[11]. 
Following Boutros-Ghali’s nomination as UN Secretary-General in 1991, the for-
eign ministry lost the initiative towards African issues in general and the Nile waters in 
particular [12]. Nevertheless, in the first half of the 1990s, there were some indications 
that suggested that the foreign ministry under Amr Moussa was continuing to influence 
Mubarak’s decisions with regard to the Nile Waters issue. This influence was evident 
in the 1993  memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Egypt and Ethiopia, of 
which the foreign ministry was considered to be the main architect. The agreement was 
signed against the will of the GIS and the ministry of irrigation, both of whom were con-
cerned at the absence of the expression “Egypt’s historical and acquired water rights” in 
the MOU’s text. “We were concerned that the absence of an explicit text on the historical 
right of Egypt might open the door towards questioning these rights in the future”, said 
an ex-intelligence senior official, who participated in these efforts early nineties [13]. This 
incident demonstrates that, at this time, the foreign ministry enjoyed an advantageous 
position with the President regarding the Nile Waters issue. This can be explained, on 
the one hand, within by the personal factor, as foreign minister Amr Moussa enjoyed 
President Mubarak’s confidence [8]. On the other hand, the effect of the momentum cre-
ated by Boutros-Ghali towards an active role for the foreign ministry in Africa continued 
throughout the early nineties [13]. 
The 1995 assassination attempt against Mubarak marked the beginning of the foreign 
ministry’s waning influence. This was in part due to the changing nature of African issues, 
which greatly concerned the security agencies. In general, all the issues considered rel-
evant to national security were shifted from the foreign ministry to the security agencies. 
The explanation given at that time was that the foreign ministry deals with such issues 
during times of normal relations and through the use of classic diplomacy. But when there 
are crises (e. g. those occurring in Darfur, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Great Lakes) 
these issues are no longer compatible with the foreign ministry’s working nature, and 
thus must be shifted to other institutions. As a result, the foreign ministry’s performance 
sharply declined due to this shift. In this sense, the Nile waters were among the issues 
that were shifted from the foreign ministry to other institutions [11]. The second half of 
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the 1990s witnessed the replacement of the foreign ministry’s influence with that of the 
Ministry of Irrigation regarding the Nile Waters issue, particularly with the nomination of 
the new Minister of Irrigation, Mahmud Abu Zeid, in 1997. Moreover, Amr Moussa had 
no genuine interest in African issues. Therefore, when the president turned away from 
Africa following the Addis Ababa incident, the foreign ministry was not willing to take 
on this role. Indeed, the foreign minister could have played a stronger role with regard to 
Africa and the Nile Basin region to contain the negative impact of Mubarak’s refusal to 
visit the African countries. However, Moussa’s inclination towards the West led him to pay 
scant attention to Africa. Furthermore, the abolition of the position of Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs restricted the ministry’s ability to conduct active personal diplomacy 
in Africa, due to the foreign minister’s busy schedule. Finally, the launch of the NBI and 
CFA (Cooperative Framework Agreement) talks coincided with the nomination of for-
eign minister Ahmed Maher (2001), who was primarily concerned with the Middle East 
Peace Process. Thus, the Nile Waters issue was arguably not on Maher’s agenda. In addi-
tion, Maher’s weak health condition and his tendency towards seeking peace led him to 
endorse low-profile diplomacy, which indeed restricted the ministry’s role [11]. 
This is, of course, not to suggest that the foreign ministry was left without any role in 
the Nile Waters issue. In addition to its participation on the Supreme Committee of the 
Nile Waters and the Legal and Technical Committee, the foreign ministry was a perma-
nent member of the Negotiation Committee, which participated in the CFA talks. More-
over, the Egyptian embassies in the Nile Basin countries continued to carry out data col-
lection work and information analysis related to the NBI [4; 11]. Furthermore, the foreign 
ministry succeeded in pushing for a stronger role for the private sector in the region. 
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit (Foreign Minister 2005-2011) supported this idea, believ-
ing that the foreign ministry’s resources were insufficient to fund Egypt’s policy in the 
Nile Basin region and that trade should be a key instrument of foreign policy. Therefore, 
Egyptian businessmen and the private sector were invited to invest in the region, with the 
aim of creating mutual interests among Egypt and the region’s states that might lead to 
ultimately political outcomes. Aboul Gheit engaged actively in the Nile Basin as he visited 
its countries, especially Ethiopia several times, accompanied by a large delegation of Egyp-
tian businessmen [11; 14, pp. 252–253]. 
As for the GIS, it continued to occupy an influential position in foreign policy formu-
lation under Mubarak. Given the importance of the Nile Waters issue to Egypt’s national 
security, the GIS was certainly involved in the decision-making process related to it. For 
example, the intelligence service was active in collecting information about the Nile Wa-
ters issue, the internal situation in the Nile Basin countries, and their foreign relations with 
other countries through specific bureaux stationed in the region, participation in various 
political and economic events taking place in the region, and other clandestine sources 
[15, pp. 89–103]. The information collected was subject to analysis and assessment by in-
telligence officers, who then presented their reports, including their recommendations, to 
the chief of intelligence. There were multiple channels through which the intelligence ser-
vice presented its perspective to the decision-maker and to the other national institutions. 
First of all, the president received a daily report from the intelligence service through his 
Secretary for Information. Secondly, the chief of intelligence was a permanent member 
of the National Security Council and the Supreme Committee of the Nile Water. Finally, 
since the chief of intelligence was one of the “president’s men” — he was the president’s 
128 Вестник СПбГУ. Востоковедение и африканистика. 2020. Т. 12. Вып. 1
number-one advisor with regard to national security — he could easily reach the president 
and convey the intelligence service’s views and recommendations [16]. Consequently, it is 
quite plausible to assume the GIS’s active involvement in policy formulation and decisions 
related to the Nile Waters issue under Mubarak.
The Entebbe Agreement Crisis 
The negotiation process began in 2003 despite existing differences in the upstream 
and the downstream countries’ positions on the right to use the Nile Waters. The main 
points of dispute were the “existing agreements” and “prior notification”. Egypt insisted 
the proposed framework should not touch the “historical and acquired rights” accord-
ing to the principle of “state succession”, which shifts the legal commitments of former 
governments to new governments. The upstream countries adopted a common position 
(based on the Nyerere Principle) that viewed these agreements as “colonial” and as a chal-
lenge to their national sovereignty [17]. The “Negotiating Committee” continued meet-
ing with the delegations of the upstream countries for seven years, without the member 
states reaching a consensus. In fact, the seven upstream countries turned their backs to the 
Egyptian position (viewed as inflexible), vowing to move on and sign the CFA on 14 May 
2010 [17]. Consequently, the following part examines the behaviour of the Egyptian insti-
tutions involved in the CFA talks in order to determine their role. 
The Presidency
Given the fact that Minister Abu Zeid was Mubarak’s advisor on the Nile Waters is-
sues, his vision prevailed upon that of the other bureaucracies and was, therefore, adopted 
by the President. This vision included the belief that there was a great need to increase 
Egypt’s water share so that the country could avoid falling under the ‘Water Poverty Line’ 
(1,000 cubic meters per person per year). This required seeking the implementation of 
mega-projects to reduce water losses in the Equatorial Heights and the White Nile. The 
second important component of Zeid’s view was the belief that it was technically impos-
sible to build big dams for the purpose of water storage on the Ethiopian Heights due to 
the topography. Therefore, while the NBI provided opportunities to increase the Nile’s 
water yield, it did not present any risk at all to Egypt’s water interests, because they were 
protected by international law and the geographical nature of the region. In fact, many 
Egyptian officials serving at other institutions, such as the foreign ministry, have always 
adopted this latter point, especially those who had had the opportunity to visit the Ethio-
pian Heights [18; 19]. Due to President Mubarak’s confidence in Abu Zeid, the former 
made the decision to participate in the NBI and engage in the framework agreement’s 
talks. Ayman Abdel Wahab commented on Mubarak’s vision for the CFA talks:
Foreign policy under Mubarak was based on the idea that Egypt’s water rights are secured 
and that the current situation in the Nile Basin Countries will not adversely affect Egyptian 
interests. Therefore, the decision-maker has dealt with the water issue by what might be 
called ‘policy of the minimum’. It means: to ensure the flow of water and to avoid escalating 
the issue or avoiding negotiations that may harm the national interests. But at the same time, 
Egypt must not stay away from the negotiations. So the trend was to prolong the talks until 
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circumstances turn in favour of Egypt or until Egypt is able to finish these talks in a way that 
preserves its strategic interests [20]. 
Furthermore, Mubarak’s knowledge of the issues at stake was not profound enough 
to enable him to establish his own political vision of such a multidimensional issue as that 
regarding the Nile Waters. Therefore, it was natural for him to be convinced by the views 
of Minister Abu Zeid, who was known for his distinguished scientific capabilities. How-
ever, Mubarak did not notice that the Ministry of Irrigation did not have employees with 
political backgrounds, as the staff was entirely comprised of irrigation experts, engineers, 
and technicians. Therefore, Abu Zeid’s absolute scientific vision did not enable him to 
understand the political nature of the talks — which, over time, had transformed into a 
political dispute [21, p. 86]. 
The question that arises here is why the president did not react appropriately when 
the negotiations began to move against Egypt’s interests. To answer this question, a num-
ber of elements must to be emphasized. First of all, Mubarak’s health was in decline; thus, 
he was unable to fulfil his duties properly, as he previously had. As a result, his son Gamal 
handled many critical issues. The Nile Waters issue was not among those in which Gamal 
Mubarak was interested. Gamal was mainly interested in business and money-making 
activities, whereas Egypt’s engagement with Africa was not of economic or financial ben-
efit to him or those who worked with him in the presidency [22]. Furthermore, President 
Mubarak was surrounded by the “old guard”, the president’s men, who received sharp 
instructions from the First Lady not inform the president about bad news [22]. Thus, it 
was quite difficult for the Egyptian officials dealing with the Nile Waters issue to inform 
him properly about the developments of the CFA talks. Therefore, the Nile Waters issue 
was not monitored closely by the presidency, leaving the door open for the bureaucracy to 
play a more independent role during the CFA talks.
A stunning example was the situation that took place during Kigali round of the CFA’s 
talks in 2007. The Egyptian delegation was taken by surprise by the change in the up-
stream countries’ position. Minister Abu Zeid’s first reaction was to threaten to withdraw 
from the negotiations. The Egyptian delegation was at the point of pulling out of the talks. 
A member of the Egyptian delegation affirms that they received directions from the min-
ister to pack and get ready to leave. At that point, some members of the delegation advised 
the minister to call Egypt’s political leadership before leaving, as the Egyptian president 
should take such a decision. Fully aware of the presidency’s situation, Minister Abu Zeid 
did not telephone President Mubarak, and changed his mind regarding the decision to 
withdraw, as he endorsed the view of the World Bank representative and other members 
of the delegations of NBCs: to stay, in search of a solution that satisfied both the upstream 
and the downstream countries [9; 23]. 
Minister Abu Zeid’s decision not to bring the issue to the political leadership and 
to remain in Kigali for further talks can be attributed to the following: Abu Zeid was 
convinced of the futility of escalating the issue to the level of the president; he also did 
not wish to take the risk of withdrawing from the meetings without the permission of 
President Mubarak “who was unable to identify all the matters of the state or the pressing 
problems that we have; however, he insists to have the final word”, according to Foreign 
Minister Aboul Gheit [14, p. 255]. The following story illustrates the extent of the presi-
dent’s lack of mental focus during the latter stages of Mubarak’s time in power:
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During his visit to the United States in 2006, Mubarak met with a senior official in the World 
Bank who informed him that the NBI framework agreement talks are proceeding in the 
right direction. Mubarak’s comment was: ‘What is it the NBI, I do not have a clue about it’ 
[9]. 
Indeed, the few decisions that Mubarak made related to the framework agreement 
talks were in response to the GIS proposal, due to his ultimate confidence on it. For exam-
ple, in 2007, the GIS strongly recommended that Mubarak “intensify contacts and coordi-
nation at the presidential level with the NBCs”1. Mubarak responded by visiting Uganda 
in 2008 and receiving the President of Rwanda in 2009. It is noteworthy that the security 
agencies opposed the idea of Mubarak’s visit to Africa; thus, he only visited Uganda for a 
few hours, while similar visits to other NBCs never occurred [14, p. 228]. 
Due to the signing of the Entebbe Agreement, Mubarak noticed that the Ministry of 
Water Resources had failed to deal with the political aspects of the Nile Waters issue. Thus, 
he decided to involve other institutions. “You [the irrigation ministry] are not politicians; 
the experts in water resources should be in charge of technical matters while the politi-
cians should be in charge of the political matters”, said Mubarak [9]. In this context, the 
Minister of International Cooperation, Fayza Aboul Naga, began to participate in the Nile 
Waters issues. Accordingly, Mubarak sent her with the foreign minister to Libya to discuss 
the possibility of Gaddafi intervening with President Museveni in order to soften Uganda’s 
tough position on the CFA talks. Therefore, Aboul Naga began to occupy the position of 
the Minister of Water Resources [14, p. 265]. 
The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
The Ministry of Water Resources had the main responsibility for the NBI, whereas the 
Nile Waters Sector was in charge of the framework agreement talks. As indicated above, 
the ministry’s policy was based on the so called ‘win-win’ vision supported by Minister 
Abu Zeid, aiming to construct water-related projects that would increase the Nile’s yield 
and Egypt’s water share. Some analysts think that, despite its great rationality, the ‘win-
win’ vision did not take into consideration the political factors that influenced the Nile 
Waters issue. This oversight can be attributed to the nature of the Ministry of Water Re-
sources, as the experts working for the ministry are scientists, not politicians. Moreover, 
they are only concerned with present problems and are unable to make future plans [21]. 
Aboul Gheit’s comment supports the contention that the Ministry’s vision disregarded 
political considerations and future repercussions that would result from agreeing to nego-
tiate the existing agreements:
For a whole seven years in which I worked as foreign minister, I always wondered: Why did 
we accept to join the World Bank initiative of 1999 that sought to gather the NBCs under an 
institutional framework that disregards the previous conditions which prevailed throughout 
the second half of the twentieth century? The answer to such a legitimate question was: It 
is the desire to enhance cooperation and build an institutional framework to achieve the 
concept of comprehensive development of the river’s resources for all of the riparian coun-
tries. I used to reply to that: We should have limited the matter to bilateral cooperation and 
1 The researcher was allowed to read an official report dated 2007 on the condition of not referencing 
it.
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worked to strengthen it in order to achieve our objectives, especially because we knew — for 
decades — about the view and stance of the [Nile] Basin countries towards our request to 
acknowledge our water share within the existing agreements…. We should have secured 
ourselves through receiving prior guarantees from the World Bank that Egypt’s participation 
in the initiative will not affect our interests, instead of delving into the unknown and con-
fronting the NBCs after 10 years of negotiations [14, p. 268]. 
The above-mentioned comment demonstrates that the vision of Minister Abu Zeid 
prevailed upon the foreign minister, as Abu Zeid monopolized the issue from the very be-
ginning and was the mastermind behind Egypt’s participation in the NBI and CFA talks. 
It also demonstrates that the Minister Aboul Gheit decided not to declare his views leaving 
the whole issue to be dealt with by the Ministry of Water Resources. Moreover, the reports 
issued by the foreign ministry to the presidency did not challenge Minister Abu Zeid’s 
position2 [24; 25]. Therefore, none of the press or parliamentary statements that the two 
ministers released included any indication of the difficulties that the Egyptian negotiator 
was facing in the CFA talks [4]. 
On the whole, the Ministry of Water Resources under Minister Abu Zeid played a 
political role that exceeded its original mandate. One of the clearest manifestations of the 
Ministry of Water Resources’ continuous intrusion into spheres generally accepted to be 
under the domain of the foreign ministry was its monopolization of the framework agree-
ment’s negotiation process. Negotiation is an ‘inherent jurisdiction’ of the foreign minis-
try, since the water and irrigation experts specialize in technical matters but lack the nego-
tiation skills necessary for tough talks [26]. It was said that the Ethiopian delegation used 
to play with psychology in order to influence the stances of the other participants: “Defi-
nitely they were trained in Israel. I attended some of the Middle East negotiation rounds 
and I know the Israeli style of negotiation” [9]. This comment signifies that the talks were 
really tough for the Egyptian negotiator, and included some psychological ‘tricks’ that the 
Egyptian delegation had not expected and for which they were not prepared.
Following the replacement of Minister Abu Zeid in 2009, the stance of the Ministry 
of Water Resources changed completely. The new minister Nasr Allam was convinced 
that Egypt’s water interests were under real threat and accused his predecessor of being 
soft and compromising on Egypt’s ‘historical rights’. This was also manifested in Allam’s 
‘negotiation style’, which was characterized by toughness, sharpness, and aggression. This 
led to an increasingly wide gap between Egypt’s position and that of the upstream coun-
tries, which complained about the nervous attitude of the Egyptian delegation [14, p. 242]. 
Unlike Abu Zeid, Allam was keen to declare his concerns to the public and the govern-
ment. In his statement to the People’s Assembly directly after the Nile-COM meeting in 
Sharm El-Sheikh in April 2010, he affirmed that the current draft of the agreement that 
the upstream countries had agreed to sign was not in Egypt’s interests. In fact, it jeop-
ardized them, as it did not respect Egypt’s ‘acquired historical rights’ under the existing 
agreements. Allam declared that the signing of the framework agreement — in its current 
form — by the upstream countries would constitute a legal violation of the procedural 
rule of ‘consensus’, which had been adopted by the NBI. In this case, he said that Egypt 
considered the CFA non-binding and without legal effect on its own water rights [27]. The 
2 The researcher was allowed to read several official reports and minutes of meetings issued by the 
foreign ministry dated 2003-2010 on the condition of not referencing it.
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different position adopted by the new minister led to disputes inside the ministry between 
those who were assistants of Abu Zeid and convinced of his vision, and the new minis-
ter. The former believed that the new minister’s statements carried too much hype and 
exaggeration, and saw the minister’s stance as an attempt to present himself to President 
Mubarak as the ‘saviour’ of Egypt’s national interests [19].
In summary, the departure of Minister Abu Zeid was a turning point for the Ministry 
of Water Resources with regard to its domination of the Nile Waters issue. Indeed, the 
president realized that the Ministry was no longer able to carry out the political role that 
it previously had. One important factor was that the new Minister of Water Resources 
lacked the political experience that would have enabled him to improve Egypt’s declining 
situation in the negotiations with the upstream countries. President Mubarak was disap-
pointed with the performance of the ministry. Therefore, the Ministry of International 
Cooperation and the foreign ministry took over the political and economic aspects of the 
Nile Waters issue from the Ministry of Water Resources. The ‘Negotiations Committee’ 
began meeting at the headquarters of the Ministry of International Cooperation instead of 
the Nile Waters Sector. Indeed, this new situation triggered “bureaucratic rivalry” among 
the three institutions, which led to the absence of “teamwork”, thus introducing more 
weakness and division into the Egyptian institutions [4].
The Foreign Ministry
The role of the foreign ministry during the CFA talks remained subordinate to that of 
the Ministry of Water Resources until the removal of Minister Abu Zeid in 2008. Many re-
ports prepared by the foreign ministry regarding the Egyptian position during the negoti-
ations demonstrate similar views to those of the Ministry of Water Resources. The foreign 
ministry’s role in policy-making was limited to the participation of the foreign minister in 
‘Supreme Commission for the Nile Waters’ meetings. As for the talks, a senior diplomat 
represented the ministry in meetings of the ‘Negotiation Committee’ and the CFA talks. 
However, the ministry’s participation in the talks had to comply with the guidelines deter-
mined by Minister Abu Zeid as the head of delegation. Accordingly, the contribution of 
the ministry’s representative during the talks was characterized by the traditional task of 
taking notes on the meetings and giving some opinions to Minister Abu Zeid, who might 
or might not use them. After each round of talks, the participant diplomat would prepare 
a report about the negotiation progress and describe in detail the position of the upstream 
countries’ delegations. These reports were rather descriptive than analytical, as it always 
included recommendations (of general nature) to intensify contacts with the upstream 
countries in search of acceptable solutions and to strengthen bilateral relations in order 
to motivate each of the seven upstream countries to adopt a more flexible stance towards 
Egypt3.
There was also a mutual understanding between Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit and 
Minister of Water Resources Abu Zeid, as the former believed that the latter had “deep 
knowledge about the Nile Waters issue, the diplomatic means of working in it, and the 
difficulties which he meets with his African counterparts” [14, p. 240]. In fact, analysts 
believe that the foreign ministry was content to put the most of the burden of a critical and 
3 The researcher was able to read some of these reports on the condition of not referencing them.
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complex issue like the Nile Waters issues on the shoulders of another institution. Accord-
ingly, the foreign ministry did not present any alternative vision for the framework agree-
ment talks whilst Minister Abu Zeid was in office, due to its belief that the Nile Waters 
issue [was] in safe hands’ [11]. Besides, some analysts and laymen believe that this attitude 
enabled the foreign ministry to disclaim responsibility for the outcomes [4].
This is not, of course, to suggest that the foreign ministry had no role whatsoever in 
the CFA talks. Indeed, the Egyptian embassies located in the upstream countries had care-
fully monitored the official positions of their host countries and media comments on the 
talks’ developments. Some embassies presented views that differed from others. Instead of 
increasing Egyptian assistance and aid as an instrument to change the tough stance of one 
of the upstream countries, the Egyptian embassy at one of the NBCs advised Egypt to halt 
its assistance, or at least not respond to the upstream country’s demand to increase it, as it 
became quite clear to the embassy that the country in question did not intend to change its 
stance and that Egypt was subject to “blackmail”4. In this regard, Aboul Gheit had reached 
similar conclusions, yet he was not able, despite his political position as foreign minister, 
to convince the president of his view [14, p. 244, 251].
When Minister Abu Zeid was removed from office, the foreign ministry’s role became 
more active with regards to ‘micro’ decisions, such as trying to put pressure on the up-
stream countries to change their positions through other external parties (e.g. the World 
Bank and France). Furthermore, the foreign minister was the architect of the Egyptian 
proposal (presented in April 2010) to the upstream countries to resume talks on the con-
troversial provisions of the framework agreement, while launching the NBI High Com-
mission was done via a “presidential declaration”. Nevertheless, the foreign minister was 
not able to convince Mubarak to temporarily halt Egypt’s participation in the NBI activi-
ties in protest against the signing of the Entebbe agreement in May 2010, demonstrating 
that the foreign minister was not able to influence the decision-maker with regards to 
‘macro’ decisions [14, p. 250].
Turning now to the role of the foreign ministry with regard to policy implementation, 
in Egypt, the effectiveness of diplomacy was highest during periods of moderation, as 
diplomacy took precedence over other instruments (such as clandestine activities, eco-
nomic assistance, and the use of physical coercion), due to the high financial and technical 
costs of these instruments [28, p. 162]. This was precisely the case under Mubarak; thus, 
foreign policy strongly depended on diplomacy [29, p. 31]. In fact, traditional diplomatic 
activity — conducted on a bilateral basis through ambassadors — was the normal mode 
of Egyptian diplomacy in the NBCs. There is permanent Egyptian representation in every 
Nile Basin country, seeking to achieve closer ties with the relevant governments in order 
to promote Egyptian interests. There are two main functions that Egyptian diplomacy 
performs: communicating between Egypt and the host country, and supervising the per-
formance of other tools including as economic, cultural, and other instruments, due to 
the absence of specialized technical bureaux in most of the Nile Basin countries (with the 
exception of for, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda). 
However, many factors contributed to weakening the efficiency of traditional diplo-
macy, constraining its capacity to achieve political coordination on issues of mutual in-
terest to these countries, the Nile Waters issue in particular. In general, every Egyptian 
4 The researcher was able to read an official report sent by the Egyptian Embassy that included this 
recommendation on the condition of not referencing it
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embassy in Africa has a contributory role in supporting bilateral relations. When this fails, 
it suggests that the embassy had not carried out its mandates properly [30]. Indeed, the 
specialized department in the headquarters of the foreign ministry has a role to play as 
well, as it directs the embassy towards the appropriate means of achieving its objectives, in 
addition to evaluating its performance. In fact, the Nile Basin department did not receive 
the necessary attention from the ministry, particularly with regard to providing it with 
knowledgeable and competent diplomats [14, p. 226]. In fact, Egyptian diplomats do not 
follow the rule of ‘specialization’ throughout their diplomatic careers. Accordingly, it was 
not necessary for the diplomats who served in the Nile Waters Unit to have previous ex-
perience with African affairs. Furthermore, since diplomats are frequently posted abroad, 
they did not have enough time to accumulate experience in Egypt. Unlike members of the 
Ministry of Irrigation and the General Intelligence Service, who keep their mandates for 
longer periods, different diplomats might handle the Nile Waters issue and relations with 
the NBCs within a very short time. This has undoubtedly had negative repercussions on 
the quality of the department’s work, constraining its capacity to provide accurate direc-
tions to the embassies and correct analysis to the foreign minister. Furthermore, diploma-
cy in the NBCs was constrained by the problem that most of the diplomats tried to avoid 
working in Africa. They were interested in serving in more glamorous places, or in those 
with easier living conditions. Within this context, much difficulty remained in filling va-
cancies at the embassies in the Nile Basin and providing them with skilled diplomats, 
especially those of high rank [14, p. 231]. Moreover, there was a lack of a sufficient number 
of diplomats to serve in each embassy. For example, during the negotiations, the embas-
sies in Juba, Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, and Asmara sent only the ambassador and one 
junior diplomat with limited experience. This situation indeed negatively impacted the 
embassies’ performance.
On the other hand, the African tendency toward supporting the patriotic leader, cou-
pled with the highly centralized nature of African political regimes, and African presi-
dents’ flair for conducting foreign affairs, make personal diplomacy a pivotal element in 
achieving foreign policy objectives. President Mubarak adopted the same approach, yet 
the degree to which he utilized this approach in Africa (and especially in the Nile Basin) 
was minimal. Mubarak made fifteen visits to ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa dur-
ing his rule, whereas more than thirty sub-Saharan countries were never included in his 
schedule. As for the Nile Basin, only one visit was made to any of them, to Uganda during 
the CFA talks in 2008. It is noteworthy that not a single presidential visit has been made to 
Ethiopia except when attending the OAU summits, the most recent in 1995 [31].
While President Mubarak was absent, other external parties with different agendas 
(which in many cases intersected with Egyptian interests) had actively engaged in the 
region and succeeded in strengthening their influence. For example, Israeli Foreign Min-
ister Avigdor Lieberman visited Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda in 2009, at the same time 
that differences were intensifying between Egypt and the upstream countries about the 
provisions of the framework agreement [31, pp. 10–11]. Indeed, Mubarak’s absence weak-
ened Egypt’s efforts to enhance bilateral relations in the Nile Basin region, for it indicated 
that the Nile Basin states were at the bottom of Egypt’s foreign policy agenda [30]. The 
words of Ugandan President Museveni demonstrated the negative effect of Mubarak’s atti-
tude: “We have never been visited by an Egyptian ‘Pharaoh’ though your [Egypt’s] origins 
descend from Uganda and the Upper Nile… I want the president to visit me, not the Vice 
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President who became the President”, referring to Mubarak’s comment that he had once 
visited Uganda when he was vice president under Sadat [14, p. 228]. In the same context, 
the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi emphasized to the former Assistant Minister 
of African Affairs that if President Mubarak had invited the presidents of the Nile Basin 
countries to a special meeting about the Nile Waters issue, the crisis would have been 
handled in a better way [32].
Analysts attribute Mubarak’s attitude towards avoiding African visits to the fact that 
the president’s safety was given priority over water and economic security [33, p. 11]. More-
over, Mubarak’s personality also contributed to this attitude, for he lacked the inclination 
to work closely with Africa [34]. President Mubarak was consumed with relations with 
celebrities; at the forefront of this group were the European leaders [14, p. 50]. Ironically, 
the Egyptian ambassadors in the Nile Basin were directed to exert all diplomatic efforts 
to strengthen bilateral relations, but their efforts to bring the Egyptian president to the re-
gion were always ignored. “It is not on the agenda at the moment”, was how the presidency 
responded to the ambassador’s frequent requests in one of the Nile Basin countries [32]. 
Furthermore, given the saying that the heaviest tasks for most Egyptian officials are the 
African ones [35], and bearing in mind the political fact that the bureaucracy has always 
been subordinate to the president [32; 36], the Nile Basin occupied a limited place on the 
agenda of Egyptian ministers’ official visits. These visits were made in cases of a certain 
crisis or problem that needing to be resolved, for they were carried out in the absence of a 
strategy for political and economic action and without prior planning [37]. Therefore, the 
impact of these intermittent visits varied between weak and almost non-existent, especial-
ly with regard to the CFA negotiations. 
The General Intelligence Service
There is no doubt that the GIS was present during the CFA talks, as its representative 
regularly attended the ‘Negotiations Committee’ meetings and the Egyptian delegation’s 
preparations that precedes each meeting. However, the question here becomes what the 
impact of its presence on the Egyptian position was during the talks. To answer this ques-
tion, sufficient information about the exact mandate of the GIS was during the CFA talks, 
and how far it succeeded in implementing its goals, is required. Due to the confidential 
nature of intelligence work and the low degree of transparency within developing coun-
tries in general, it is difficult to access the necessary information to answer these ques-
tions. However, observing the talks’ developments does lead to the following analysis.
As previously indicated, the principle mandate of the intelligence service is gathering, 
examining, and spreading information to the president and to other institutions. Thus, 
the fact that the Egyptian delegation was taken by surprise by the sudden change in the 
stances of the equatorial countries at the Kigali meeting in 2007 demonstrates that none of 
the delegation members had prior knowledge of it. Notably, since the Egyptian delegation 
included representatives from various institutions, it is clear that none of these institutions 
had been informed of the new developments prior to the meeting. Furthermore, the way 
President Mubarak acted during the talks demonstrates that he did not perceive that the 
situation was moving against Egypt’s interests.
From this analysis, we can conclude that something went wrong with the GIS’s work 
on the issue of the CFA negotiations. Therefore, several questions arise: did the intelli-
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gence offices located in the region manage to gather correct information about the up-
stream countries’ positions? If the answer is yes, was the information brought to the head 
of intelligence, Omar Suleiman, or was it blocked at some stage for one reason or an-
other? Assuming that the information had already reached Suleiman, was he convinced 
of its plausibility and did he submit it to the president? Finally, was President Mubarak 
convinced by the materials that he received from the GIS, and did he begin to make de-
cisions according to it? In summary, unless answers are found to these questions, the role 
of the GIS during the framework agreement negotiations will remain difficult to assess5.
Conclusion
The paper analyzed the Nile Waters issue under President Mubarak given the geo-
graphic fact that the Nile River the main water source for Egypt and that waters originate 
entirely from outside the Egyptian territory. The question raised is: what was the role of 
national institutions with regard to Nile Waters issue decisions? It appears that, unlike 
other foreign policy issues in Egypt, national policy towards the Nile Waters issue was 
the outcome of a comprehensive discourse among multiple national institutions, and that 
there was a consensus among these institutions about the general direction of Egyptian 
policy. The policy outlines emphasized that the Nile Waters issue was directly related to 
Egypt’s national security and that the country was already suffering from a water scarcity 
situation. The situation would require immediate action to increase water resources, and 
to ensure there is no shortage in the current water share of 55 BCM. However, the deci-
sion-making process has another story to tell, for it was concentrated mainly in the hands 
of the president. This answers the above-mentioned question. Among various national 
institutions, such as the Ministry of Irrigation, the foreign ministry and the intelligence 
service, it is evident that President Mubarak’s decisions regarding the Nile Waters issue 
depended largely on the vision adopted by the Ministry of Irrigation, particularly during 
the last decade of his presidency, which coincided with the Nile Basin Initiative talks. The 
development of each institution supports this analysis: the most important of these factors 
was Mubarak’s tendency to diminish the role of the foreign ministry after the appointment 
of Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, on the one hand, and some personality factors which 
led him to confide in the Minister of Irrigation, Mahmud Abu Zaid, who became his key 
advisor on Egypt’s water policy, on the other.
In this context, throughout the different phases of the Cooperative Framework Agree-
ment negotiations under the Nile Basin Initiative (from 2003 to 2010) the paper examined 
the role national institutions played regarding foreign policy-making during the given pe-
riod. The analysis examined a number of elements regarding the foreign policy decision-
making process in Egypt, and the degree to which the president was responsible for the 
final policy outcomes. It also highlighted the fact that Egypt’s foreign policy diplomatic 
instrument suffer from clear deficiencies that did not enable the Egyptian state to achieve 
the water policy objectives, no matter how rational the foreign policy decisions were. Ac-
cordingly, the concluding section will attempt to abstract from this specific issue (Egyp-
tian policy towards the Nile Waters issue) a number of general remarks relating to Egypt’s 
African foreign policy-making under President Mubarak and the role of the bureaucracy:
5 The researcher had great difficulty to have access to data related to the General Intelligence Service’s 
work. Her request was officially rejected by the competent authorities
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First, the one-to-one approach adopted by President Mubarak in decision-making 
(considering each minister his principal advisor while neutralizing the role of other na-
tional institutions) gave the opportunity to some senior officials to play more influential 
roles than others relating to certain foreign policy issues that should not have been subject 
to institutional monopoly because of the multi-dimensional nature of these issues. In the 
Nile Waters issue, this explains some minsters’ refrainment (including that of the foreign 
minister and perhaps the chief of intelligence) to provide the president with opinions dif-
fering from those of Minister Abu Zeid (Mubarak’s advisor on the Nile Waters issue), as 
they knew that Mubarak was convinced of Abu Zeid’s view. 
Second, the president’s weak health, which even affected his ability to make rational 
assessments during the last five years of his rule, left the door open to the inner circle 
(the President’s men) to separate him from other political advisors. In the absence of the 
decision-maker, institutions stepped forward to fill this gap. The result was the emergence 
of institutional rivalry, as each institution attempted to impose its own vision and to mo-
nopolize micro-level decisions.
Third, in terms of the high political cost of military usage and the lack of economic 
capability, traditional diplomacy was the most widely used instrument of Egypt’s Africa 
policies. However, despite the extensive existence of the Egyptian embassies in Africa, due 
to various deficiencies, this instrument was unable to realize the ultimate target of achiev-
ing Egypt’s foreign policy objectives. In the Nile Waters case, the instrument utilized was 
not sufficient to reinforce the positions of the ‘negotiating team’ against the tough posi-
tions of the upstream countries during the CFA talks.
In summary, Egypt’s policy towards the Nile Waters issue is symptomatic of Egypt’s 
Africa policies deficiencies. In light of prominent scholar Gamal Hamdan’s belief that for-
eign policy is a demonstration of the internal situation of the state, this paper has dealt 
with key domestic element responsible for Egypt’s foreign policy towards Africa and the 
Nile Waters issue, the role of the bureaucracy in the decision-making process. It con-
cludes that the performance of the Egyptian institutions dealing with the Nile Waters issue 
left a lot to be desired. Such assessment includes the principal decision-maker (President 
Mubarak) and the bureaucracies. On a more general level, the question can be raised: how 
did Africa rate among Egypt’s national interests? The discussions indicate that Africa was 
at the bottom of the pile of Egypt’s foreign policy agenda under Mubarak and that the 
Egyptian bureaucracy can be held responsible for the setbacks of the policy. 
Accordingly, further analysis on the change in the decision-making process of Egypt’s 
Africa policies, post-Mubarak era, has to be conducted. Undoubtedly Egypt’s Africa re-
lations witness an unmistaken improvement since President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi held 
power in 2014. This is attributed to the extended use of presidential diplomacy, the tool 
that has been absent in Egypt’s Africa policies since 1995 until the ousting of President 
Hosni Mubarak. Sisi started his duties in June 2014 with Egypt’s resuming its participation 
in the African Union’s activities which was suspended after the overthrow of President 
Mohamed Morsi in 2013. President Sisi’s active engagement in Africa resulted into similar 
behaviour from the Egyptian bureaucracy which suddenly became interested to conduct 
various activities in the continent. Such behaviour confirms the analysis that in the states 
characterized by central regimes, the political leader monopolizes the decision-making 
process to the extent that other state actors remain subordinate to him. In Egypt, there will 
always be a correlation between active Africa policies and the degree of which the presi-
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dent is interested in these policies. To illustrate, there is a positive relation between Egypt’s 
active engagement in Africa and the President’s foreign policy inclination. The more the 
Egyptian president shows interest towards Africa, the more engaged the Egyptian institu-
tions are in the continent’s issues. As for the bureaucracy, it is more likely that the balance 
of power will remain in favour of the presidency, the security agencies and the defence 
ministry with regard to the foreign policy decision-making process in Egypt. For this situ-
ation to change, dramatic changes of the characteristics and the behaviour of the political 
regime have to take place, which is unlikely to happen in the time being. 
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Принятие решений в Египте во время правления президента Хосни Мубарака осу-
ществлялось преимущественно им самим и небольшой ключевой группой советников, 
которую он назначал и распускал. Ближе к концу своего правления президент Муба-
рак уже не был способен достаточно эффективно выполнять свои обязанности. Тем 
не менее, часть вопросов была отдана на откуп профильным министерствам. Бюро-
кратический аппарат получил возможность существенно влиять на внешнюю полити-
ку, особенно в тех областях, которые не представляли особого интереса для правящей 
элиты. В этом контексте, проблема нильского водопользования — наиболее яркое во-
площение процесса принятия решений в египетской внешней политике при президен-
те Мубараке. Цель статьи — исследовать роль институтов в проблеме водопользова-
ния. Исследование стремится показать, что главную роль в переговорах по рамочному 
договору о совместном водопользовании играло министерство водных ресурсов, а не 
министерство иностранных дел. Также в исследовании говорится о «бюрократическом 
противостоянии», происходившем в то время. Из-за него египетской стороне при-
шлось столкнуться со значительными трудностями во время переговоров. Таким об-
разом, продолжаются споры о том, что бюрократический аппарат, несмотря на свое 
подчиненное положение, является частично ответственным за неудачные результаты 
внешней политики Египта во время правления президента Мубарака.
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